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Why have global voluntary frameworks on cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR) become 
increasingly popular in the past decade, and 
what impact do they have on adherents’ actual 
behavior? Concerning the first question, several 
scholars have examined the political dynamics 
that led to the emergence of CSR frameworks 
(Bartley 2007a; Sagafi-Nejad 2008). Few stud-
ies, however, have systematically examined the 
subsequent growth of the number of adher-
ents to these frameworks. Growth in global 
CSR activity has outpaced most observers’ 
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Abstract
This article examines why global corporate social responsibility (CSR) frameworks have 
gained popularity in the past decade, despite their uncertain costs and benefits, and how they 
affect adherents’ behavior. We focus on the two largest global frameworks—the United Nations 
Global Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative—to examine patterns of CSR adoption by 
governments and corporations. Drawing on institutional and political-economy theories, we 
develop a new analytic framework that focuses on four key environmental factors—global 
institutional pressure, local receptivity, foreign economic penetration, and national economic 
system. We propose two arguments about the relationship between stated commitment and 
subsequent action: decoupling due to lack of capacity and organized hypocrisy due to lack of 
will. Our cross-national time-series analyses show that global institutional pressure through 
nongovernmental linkages encourages CSR adoption, but this pressure leads to ceremonial 
commitment in developed countries and to substantive commitment in developing countries. 
Moreover, in developed countries, liberal economic policies increase ceremonial commitment, 
suggesting a pattern of organized hypocrisy whereby corporations in developed countries 
make discursive commitments without subsequent action. We also find that in developing 
countries, short-term trade relations exert greater influence on corporate CSR behavior than 
do long-term investment transactions.
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expectations and poses a puzzle: why would 
contemporary corporations, whose primary 
goals are to maximize profit and shareholder 
wealth, commit to progressive principles that do 
not generate immediate or tangible benefits? We 
argue that changes in the global normative envi-
ronment have prompted many corporations to 
pledge commitment to CSR principles. In this 
regard, we draw on a recent development in 
CSR research that examines the broader envi-
ronmental factors that encourage CSR efforts 
(Bartley 2007a, 2007b; Campbell 2007; Hoff-
man 2001; Potoski and Prakash 2005; Prakash 
and Potoski 2006). While most existing studies 
view CSR as a property of the firm, these more 
recent studies recognize the effect of national 
and international contexts on CSR activities. We 
draw on these studies to propose a theoretical 
model and test its utility in explaining the grow-
ing but uneven number of stated commitments 
to CSR principles across the world.
Our second question is whether these grow-
ing commitments to CSR are substantive ones 
that adherents intend to implement or ceremo-
nial ones that have little subsequent effect. 
Current research offers two predictions. The 
world society approach sees adoption of global 
models, such as participation in global CSR 
frameworks, as largely mimetic behavior by 
local actors who might or might not have the 
capacity to implement those models and pre-
dicts decoupling of stated policies and prac-
tices. This view sees decoupling as most 
endemic in developing countries that do not 
have the resources to align their practices with 
global models (Meyer et al. 1997). On the 
other hand, a variant of world-system theory 
critical of global CSR frameworks sees them 
as a case of “organized hypocrisy” (Krasner 
1999), in which rich corporations and devel-
oped countries make discursive commitments 
to CSR without the will to deliver on their 
promises. From this point of view, many cor-
porations in developed countries make cere-
monial commitments to deflect criticisms 
about their practices and to circumvent binding 
regulations. We test these arguments in cross-
national analyses that use indicators of cere-
monial and substantive commitments to CSR.
The analytic framework we propose inte-
grates institutional and political-economy the-
ories to better explain the widespread diffusion 
of global CSR frameworks and their uneven 
implementation across the world. We delineate 
four dimensions of environmental effects on 
organizational behavior—global institutional 
pressure, local receptivity, foreign economic 
penetration, and national economic system—
and present the first systematic analysis of 
corporate participation in the two most widely-
endorsed global CSR frameworks, the United 
Nations Global Compact and the Global 
Reporting Initiative. We test proposed effects 
of institutional and political-economy theories 
simultaneously and examine how these factors 
work differently in developed and developing 
countries. In current cross-national research, 
most world-system analyses focus only on 
developing countries (Dixon and Boswell 
1996; Kentor 1998; Kentor and Boswell 2003), 
while most world society studies do not distin-
guish between different types of countries (but 
see Longhofer and Schofer 2010). We move 
beyond this dichotomy to present a more 
nuanced approach to understanding the effect 
of institutional and political-economy environ-
ments on local organizational behavior.
HISToRICAL BACKGRouNd: 
THE RISE of GLoBAL 
VoLuNTARy CSR 
fRAmEwoRKS
In this research, we follow Davis, Whitman, 
and Zald (2008:32) in defining global CSR 
norms as a set of principles that “hold firms 
responsible for actions far beyond their bound-
aries, including the actions of suppliers, dis-
tributors, alliance partners, and even sovereign 
nations.”1 These norms are at work, for exam-
ple, when apparel giants such as the Gap face 
protests by students and unions in the United 
States for exploiting teenage labor in El 
Salvador or Guatemala (Seidman 2007), or 
when major food producers such as Gerber 
become targets of Greenpeace-led campaigns 
against the use of genetically modified grains 
Lim and Tsutsui 71
(Soule 2009). Growing legitimacy of these 
norms constitutes a significant departure from 
business as usual, especially in an era dominated 
by pervasive neoliberal commitment to the 
supremacy of market mechanisms, deregulation, 
and short-term economic interests. It is certainly 
a far cry from Friedman’s (1970) proclamation a 
generation ago that “the social responsibility of 
business is to increase its profits.”
Efforts to institutionalize global CSR 
norms date to the early 1970s. For instance, 
the United Nations (UN) established the 
Center on Transnational Corporations in 
1974; the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) adopted 
its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in 
1976; and the International Labor Organiza-
tion (ILO) adopted the Tripartite Declaration 
of Principles Concerning Multinational Enter-
prises and Social Policy in 1977.2 These 
attempts by intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs) remained largely symbolic, however, 
as corporations and developed countries’ gov-
ernments lobbied aggressively against bind-
ing international law (Hansen and Aranda 
1991; Hedley 1999; Sagafi-Nejad 2008; 
Shamir 2004; Sikkink 1986).
Despite these failed attempts, heightened 
civil society sensitivity toward environmental 
and human rights violations in recent dec-
ades, coupled with growing normative pres-
sures on state and non-state actors to address 
these issues, has given a second wind to CSR 
efforts (Mayer and Gereffi 2010; Waddock 
2009). Major corporate scandals served as 
triggers for many corporations to develop 
industry self-regulation initiatives and self-
imposed codes of conduct. For instance, in 
the aftermath of Union Carbide’s Bhopal 
chemical disaster in 1984, the U.S.-based 
Chemical Manufacturers Association estab-
lished an industry-level framework called the 
Responsible Care Program (King and Lennox 
2000). Similarly, following Nike’s sweatshop 
scandal in 1996, the apparel industry estab-
lished the Fair Labor Association in 1998 
(Baron 2003; Bartley 2007a).3 Threat of gov-
ernment regulation has also encouraged cor-
porate attempts at self-regulation (Delmas 
and Terlaak 2002; Haufler 2001; Maxwell, 
Lyon, and Hackett 2000; Shamir 2004).
Although some of these self-regulatory 
measures produced positive outcomes, it 
became increasingly evident to activists, gov-
ernments, international organizations, and 
corporations that a disparate collection of 
national- or industry-level frameworks was 
not sufficient to address global CSR chal-
lenges (Ruggie 2003). Since the late 1990s, 
this recognition has led to renewed efforts to 
establish global CSR frameworks (Shanahan 
and Khagram 2006; Whitehouse 2003). 
Reflecting the political settlement among cor-
porations, governments, and civil society 
actors (Bartley 2007a), these frameworks 
tend to rely on voluntary self-reporting rather 
than rigorous monitoring or strict enforce-
ment. Among such frameworks, we focus on 
the two most prominent ones, the UN Global 
Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative.4
THE GLoBAL ComPACT ANd 
THE GLoBAL REPoRTING 
INITIATIVE
Proposed by then-Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan at the World Economic Forum in 1999 
and formally launched in 2000, the UN 
Global Compact (GC) is a voluntary initiative 
intended primarily for corporations to pledge 
commitment to human/labor rights and envi-
ronmentalism (and anti-corruption after 2004) 
(Wynhoven and Senne 2004). Table 1 lists the 
10 GC principles, which represent widely 
sanctioned international norms. (Principle 10 
was added in 2004 only after the UN treaty on 
anti-corruption was adopted in 2003.) The 
GC is essentially a platform for interaction 
and learning among concerned corporations 
and other relevant actors to promote these 10 
principles. The only prerequisite for initial 
participation is a letter stating commitment to 
GC principles. Run by a handful of officials, 
the GC relies heavily on self-reporting by 
corporations and voluntary monitoring by 
civil society actors and does not engage in 
monitoring or certification.
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We examine two types of participation in 
the Global Compact—government endorse-
ment and corporate participation. First, 
although the GC’s primary target is corpora-
tions, a country-level GC launch event that 
involves members of government, prominent 
corporations, UN agencies, civil society 
organizations, trade unions, and academia 
often plays an important role in encouraging 
corporate commitment to GC principles. 
While the composition of stakeholders varies 
across countries, a Global Compact launch 
always requires concerted action between dif-
ferent organizations, including government 
support, whether tacit or explicit.5 We thus 
see launch of the Global Compact in a coun-
try as signifying government endorsement for 
the GC.6 By the end of 2007, 68 countries had 
launched the Global Compact.7
Second, corporations participate in the 
Global Compact by sending a CEO- and board-
sanctioned affidavit to the UN Global Compact 
Office. More than 4,000 corporations of differ-
ent industry backgrounds and sizes from more 
than 100 countries had signed up as members by 
the end of 2007. We treat the number of corpo-
rate GC participants in a country as a measure 
of baseline commitment to CSR.
The GC’s voluntary nature and minimal 
requirements did not go unnoticed by civil 
society actors who were suspicious that cor-
porations were merely using the UN’s legiti-
macy to cover, or bluewash, their socially 
irresponsible practices. Early in 2000, for 
example, social movement organizations 
mounted sustained criticisms of GC participa-
tion by transnational corporations like Nestlé 
and Coca-Cola, arguing that the GC was a 
symbolic tool that did not require any con-
crete action (Corporate Europe Observatory 
2000; Transnational Resource Action Center 
2000). In response, the GC Office required all 
participating corporations to submit annual 
Communications on Progress (COPs). COPs 
are self-disclosure reports that must include a 
description of practical actions taken to 
implement GC principles. By the end of 
2007, the GC Office had received more than 
3,000 COPs. In 2005, the Global Compact 
Office also began naming and shaming cor-
porate participants who had failed to submit 
the requisite Communications on Progress in 
an attempt to encourage more concrete corpo-
rate action in support of GC principles. In 
2007, there were 404 non-reporting corpora-
tions. We obtained data on non-reporting 
Table 1. The 10 Principles of the UN Global Compact
Substantive Area Principle
Human Rights 1. Business should support and respect the protection of internationally 
proclaimed human rights; and
 2. Make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.
Labor Standards 3. Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining;
 4. The elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labor;
 5. The effective abolition of child labor; and
 6. The elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupa-
tion.
Environment 7. Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental 
challenges;
 8. Undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; 
and
 9. Encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly 
technologies.
Anti-corruption 10. Businesses should work against all forms of corruption, including extor-
tion and bribery.
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corporations (i.e., corporations who made the 
baseline commitment but failed to submit 
COPs) from the GC Office and use this as an 
indicator of ceremonial commitment, that is, 
decoupling between stated commitment and 
concrete action.8
In contrast to ceremonial commitment, 
participation in the Global Reporting Initia-
tive (GRI) indicates substantive commitment 
to CSR. Established in 1997, the GRI is a 
nongovernmental organization whose main 
activity is to facilitate dissemination of its 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines for cor-
porations to voluntarily disclose their eco-
nomic, environmental, and social activities. 
Currently, more than 2,000 organizations are 
registered with the GRI. GRI guidelines are 
considerably more detailed, rigorous, and 
standardized compared to a simple endorse-
ment of the Global Compact and the varying 
quality of its Communications on Progress. 
Table 2 lists the suggested performance indi-
cators the GRI expects when corporations use 
the Sustainability Reporting Guidelines for 
disclosure purposes. We include an example 
of environmental indicators that corporations 
are expected to detail when they adopt GRI 
guidelines. Corporations do not need to report 
on every single indicator, but few would 
adopt GRI guidelines without a substantive 
commitment to measure and disclose their 
CSR practices. We collected data on the num-
ber of corporations that use the Sustainability 
Reporting Guidelines in each country from 
the GRI’s online database.9 Although the 
Global Compact and Global Reporting Initia-
tive are distinct entities, the GC Office 
encourages participants to employ GRI Sus-
tainability Reporting Guidelines when sub-
mitting their Communications on Progress. 
There is thus some overlap between COP 
submission and GRI registration, but many 
corporations use GRI guidelines without 
being a GC member, and many others become 
members of GC and submit Communications 
on Progress without using GRI.10
By way of summary, Table 3 shows the top 
10 countries along the three types of corpo-
rate commitments, and Figure 1 shows the 
annual cumulative distribution of GC launches 
(bar chart) and the three types of cor- 
porate commitments (three lines).11 Figure 1 
clearly demonstrates governments’ and cor-
porations’ rapid adoption of global CSR 
frameworks, while Table 3 suggests different 
patterns between substantive and ceremonial 
commitments to these frameworks. Our mul-
tivariate analyses examine these trends, 
focusing in particular on the various environ-
mental factors that lead corporations in a 





Many scholars have examined economic conse-
quences of CSR adoption at the firm-level but 
have found little evidence that it brings tangible 
economic benefits (Margolis and Walsh 2003; 
Pava and Krausz 1995). Other researchers point 
to reputation gains, arguing that stated commit-
ments to CSR principles might bring public 
relations benefits and signal the company, 
industry, or nation as desirable investment tar-
gets (King 2008; Meyer 1996; Soysa and Oneal 
1999). Still other scholars counter this point, 
contending that adoption can increase business 
costs associated with CSR efforts and invite 
criticisms of not living up to stated promises 
(Smith 2010). Despite disagreements over the 
effects of CSR adoption, all of the studies share 
the premise that firm-level cost–benefit calcula-
tion drives corporate CSR behavior. For 
instance, some researchers have conducted sur-
veys of corporate elites and found reputation to 
be a driving force of CSR activities (Googins 
et al. 2009; Lacy et al. 2010). If one takes these 
results at face value, CSR appears as a predict-
able outcome of cost–benefit analyses in which 
reputational benefits outweigh any associated 
costs. While not discounting these calculations, 
we argue that an exclusive focus on internal 
corporate dynamics overlooks changes in 
international and national environments that 
have made CSR a significant factor in these 
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Table 2. GRI Sustainability Reporting Guidelines
Disclosure Standard Performance Indicators
Environmental Materials; energy; water; biodiversity; emissions, effluents, and waste; 
products and services; compliance; transport
Human Rights Investment and procurement practices; non-discrimination; freedom of 
association/ collective bargaining; child labor; forced and compulsory 
labor; security practices; indigenous rights
Labor Practices and Decent 
Work
Employment; labor/management relations; occupational health and 
safety; training and education; diversity and equal opportunity
Society Community; corruption; public policy; anti-competitive behavior; 
compliance
Product Responsibility Customer health and safety; product and service labeling; marketing 
communications; customer privacy; compliance
Economic Economic performance; market presence; indirect economic impact
Example: Environmental  
Disclosure Standards
Materials EN1: Materials used by weight or volume.
EN2: Percentage of materials used that are recycled input materials.
Energy EN3: Direct energy consumption by primary energy source.
EN4: Indirect energy consumption by primary source.
EN5: Energy saved due to conservation and efficiency improvements.
EN6: Initiatives to provide energy-efficient or renewable energy based 
products and services, and reductions in energy requirements as a 
result of these initiatives.
EN7: Initiatives to reduce indirect energy consumption and reductions 
achieved.
Water EN8: Total water withdrawal by source.
EN9: Water sources significantly affected by withdrawal of water.
EN10: Percentage and total volume of water recycled and reused.
 Biodiversity EN11: Location and size of land owned, leased, managed in, or adjacent 
to, protected areas and areas of high biodiversity value outside pro-
tected areas.
 EN12: Description of significant impacts of activities, products, and ser-
vices on biodiversity in protected areas and areas of high biodiversity 
value outside protected areas.
 EN13: Habitats protected or restored.
 EN14: Strategies, current actions, and future plans for managing impacts 
on biodiversity.
 EN15: Number of IUCN Red List species and national conservation 
list species with habitats in areas affected by operations, by level of 
extinction risk.
 Emissions, effluents, 
 and waste
EN16: Total direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions by weight.
EN17: Other relevant indirect greenhouse gas emissions by weight.
 EN18: Initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and reductions 
achieved.
 EN19: Emissions of ozone-depleting substances by weight.
 EN20: NO, SO, and other significant air emissions by type and weight.
 EN21: Total water discharge by quality and destination.
 EN22: Total weight of waste by type and disposal method.
 EN23: Total number and volume of significant spills.
 EN24: Weight of transported, imported, exported, or treated waste deemed 
hazardous under the terms of the Basel Convention Annex I, II, III, and 
VIII, and percentage of transported waste shipped internationally.
(continued)
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calculations and altered the assessment of costs 
and benefits. Business buzzwords such as “rep-
utation management” or “stakeholder engage-
ment” have invaded cost–benefit analysis as 
growing social pressures have pushed corpora-
tions to rationalize CSR-related engagements 
(King 2008; Power 2007). In other words, exter-
nal forces have transformed CSR “from heresy 
to dogma” for contemporary corporations 
(Hoffman 2001). We thus argue that sociologi-
cal analyses of these social forces, rather than 
the more common economic analysis of the 
internal organizational calculus, are essential to 
better understand the growing worldwide popu-
larity of CSR frameworks and their markedly 
uneven embrace by corporate and state actors.
In this regard, we draw on the economic 
sociology literature that emphasizes the role of 
social embeddedness in economic interactions 
(Fligstein 1990, 1996; Granovetter 1985; Miz-
ruchi, Stearns, and Marquis 2006). Many com-
parative studies in this literature examine 
countries as the unit of analysis because most 
economic institutions operate at the country 
Table 3. Types of CSR Participation, Top 10 Countries, 2000 to 2007
Baseline Commitment Substantive Commitment Ceremonial Commitment
Global Compact  
Participants




France 472 Spain 347 France 129
Spain 323 USA 248 Argentina 90
Mexico 274 UK 151 Spain 44
Argentina 201 Japan 138 Brazil 44
Brazil 169 Netherlands 127 Bulgaria 40
China 140 South Africa 121 Italy 36
USA 136 Australia 110 Peru 35
India 131 Canada 97 USA 33
Italy 113 Germany 96 Mexico 33
Germany 102 Italy 84 Panama 31
Disclosure Standard Performance Indicators
 EN25: Identity, size, protected status, and biodiversity value of water 
bodies and related habitats significantly affected by the reporting 
organization’s discharges of water and runoff.
 Products and services EN26: Initiatives to mitigate environmental impacts of products and 
services, and extent of impact mitigation.
 EN27: Percentage of products sold and their packaging materials that are 
reclaimed by category.
 Compliance EN28: Monetary value of significant fines and total number of non-
monetary sanctions for noncompliance with environmental laws and 
regulations.
 Transport EN29: Significant environmental impacts of transporting products and 
other goods and materials used for the organization’s operations, and 
transporting members of the workforce.
 Overall EN30: Total environmental protection expenditures and investments by 
type.
Source: Global Reporting Initiative online database (http://www.globalreporting.org).
Table 2. (continued)
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level or are mediated by state actors, and effects 
of environmental influences can be more effec-
tively measured at the country level than at the 
corporate level (Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 
2004; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; 
Garcia-Johnson 2000; Guler, Guillén, and 
Macpherson 2002; Henisz, Zelner, and Guillén 
2005; Prakash and Potoski 2006; Shanahan and 
Khagram 2006). Building on these studies, and 
drawing specifically on the distinction between 
institutional and market-based approaches that 
has become common in the literature (Bartley 
2007a; Drori 2006; Power 2007),12 we develop 
our institutional and political-economy argu-
ments regarding growing government endorse-
ment and corporate participation in CSR 
frameworks.
Table 4 presents our four-fold categoriza-
tion, distinguishing between international and 
national domains and institutional and politi-
cal-economy mechanisms. We examine insti-
tutional effects that (1) exert global institutional 
Table 4. Four Dimensions of Environmental Effects on Organizational Behavior: Factors  
Affecting Adoption of Global CSR Frameworks
International Level National Level
Institutional Factors Global Institutional Pressure Local Receptivity
 H1: The more a country is con-
nected to international society, 
whether through governmental 
or nongovernmental linkages, the 
more likely its government and 
corporations will participate in 
global CSR frameworks.
H2: The greater the legitimacy of 
CSR principles in a country and 
the more rationalized the business 
environment, the more likely its 
government and corporations 
will participate in global CSR 
frameworks.
Political- Economy Factors Foreign Economic Penetration National Economic System
 H3: Cross-national economic rela-
tions, through either short- or 
long-term transactions, exert 
pressure on governments and 
corporations in developing coun-
tries to participate in global CSR 
frameworks.
H4: The more liberal a national eco-
nomic system, the more likely the 
government and corporations in a 
country will participate in global 
CSR frameworks.
figure 1. Cumulative Count of Global Compact Launches in All Countries, 2000 to 2007
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pressure on CSR in the international domain 
and (2) shape local receptivity to CSR in the 
national domain, and political-economy effects 
in the form of (3) foreign economic penetra-
tion at the international level and (4) national 
economic system at the national level.
Institutional Arguments: Global 
Institutional Pressure and Local 
Receptivity
Institutional theory explains organizational 
behavior in terms of the social environment in 
which organizations operate. Scholars in this 
tradition argue that coercive, mimetic, and 
normative forces lead many organizations to 
adopt organizational forms and policies that 
are considered legitimate in their field 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and 
Rowan 1977). The world society approach, 
an application of institutionalism to interna-
tional relations, demonstrates that linkage to 
international society exerts pressures on local 
actors to subscribe to internationally sanc-
tioned models. This approach predicts 
increasing isomorphism in the structures, 
behavior, and policies of local organizations 
in various national contexts as they adopt 
legitimate models in international society 
(Meyer 2000; Meyer et al. 1997; Thomas et 
al. 1987). Empirical studies demonstrate, for 
instance, how global institutions reorient 
national policies and practices around human 
rights (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005), the 
environment (Frank 1999), governance 
(Drori, Jang, and Meyer 2006), and account-
ing (Jang 2006). Given the growing interna-
tional legitimacy of CSR principles, we 
expect this institutional effect to encourage 
governments and corporations to support 
global CSR frameworks.
Global civil society is a major source of 
world society pressure (Boli and Thomas 
1997; Lechner and Boli 2005). Research 
demonstrates that linkage to international 
nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) 
empowers local civil society and promotes 
progressive ideas (Smith 2002; Soule 2009; 
Tsutsui and Shin 2008). In the case of CSR, 
we expect INGOs to diffuse ideas about 
human rights, environmental protection, and 
transparent governance and to encourage 
domestic actors to adopt and implement 
global CSR frameworks. Furthermore, sub-
sets of INGOs that work on specific issues 
related to CSR, such as human rights and the 
environment, are likely to exert strong pres-
sure on corporations to adopt CSR frame-
works.
International treaties on CSR-related issues 
constitute another source of world society 
pressure (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). 
When governments ratify these treaties, the 
government and relevant private actors in a 
country face greater pressure to comply with 
treaty provisions. Of the four core issues that 
major global CSR frameworks address, three 
of them—human rights, labor rights, and 
environmental protection—have a well-devel-
oped set of international treaties sponsored by 
the UN (Abu Sharkh 2009; Frank, Hironaka, 
and Schofer 2000; Schofer and Hironaka 
2005; Wotipka and Tsutsui 2008).13 As gov-
ernments ratify these treaties, we expect the 
number of adherents to global CSR frame-
works to increase. The following hypothesis 
summarizes these discussions:
Hypothesis 1: The more a country is connected 
to international society, whether through 
governmental or nongovernmental link-
ages, the more likely its government and 
corporations will participate in global CSR 
frameworks.
The degree to which global institutional 
pressure has an impact depends on how recep-
tive domestic social environments are to CSR 
principles (Frank et al. 2000). Domestic envi-
ronments in which CSR principles are per-
ceived as legitimate can be more conducive to 
government and corporate participation in 
CSR frameworks. Given the progressive char-
acter of CSR principles, we expect these ideas 
to carry greater legitimacy in more developed 
democracies (cf. Wejnert 2005; Welzel, 
Inglehart, and Klingemann 2003) where 
citizens have a better understanding of CSR 
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issues and are more likely to engage in orga-
nized activities to hold businesses account-
able for their actions (Vogel 1989, 2005). We 
also expect that increasing societal accep-
tance will enhance the legitimacy of 
CSR norms, either through broader societal 
pressure in the form of a Global Compact 
launch or through corporate peer pressure in 
the form of a large number of corporate GC 
participants.
In addition, as Power (2007) argues, corpo-
rations in rationalized business environments, 
in which calculability and predictability have 
top priority for corporate decision-making, 
place more legitimacy on CSR frameworks as 
part of their risk/reputation management strat-
egies. The basis of a rationalized business 
environment is an impersonal, rule-based gov-
ernance system that values transparent and 
predictable business operations and disavows 
corrupt practices. Corporations in rationalized 
business environments tend to have extensive 
experience in adopting new legitimated busi-
ness strategies, such as the multidivisional 
form (Fligstein 1990), quality control (Strang 
and Jung 2009), and risk management (Power 
2004). These corporations are more likely to 
possess the organizational apparatus and 
know-how to quickly adopt new and fashion-
able organizational models. We thus expect 
that countries with more transparent govern-
ments and rationalized business environments 
will be more likely to embrace global CSR 
frameworks.
Hypothesis 2: The greater the legitimacy of 
CSR principles in a country and the more 
rationalized the business environment, the 
more likely its government and corporations 
will participate in global CSR frameworks.
Political-Economy Arguments: 
Foreign Economic Penetration and 
National Economic System
Political-economy theories emphasize the role 
of economic dependence and power relations. 
At the international level, political-economy 
explanations hold that international economic 
relations shape government and corporate 
behavior. The archetypal political-economy 
approach to international relations, world-
system theory, argues that core countries set 
the terms of international economic transac-
tions in such a way that enables them to retain 
their advantageous positions, thereby doom-
ing peripheral countries to dependence and 
underdevelopment (Wallerstein 1979). For 
example, studies show that foreign capital and 
investment dependence negatively affect 
domestic development for developing countries 
in the long run (Chase-Dunn 1975; Kentor 
1998; Kentor and Boswell 2003; but see also 
Alderson and Nielson 1999; Dixon and Boswell 
1996; Firebaugh 1996). Similarly, other schol-
ars argue that global economic competition 
results in a race to the bottom as transnational 
corporations seek out countries with lax human 
rights, labor, and environmental expectations 
(Smith, Bolyard, and Ippolito 1999). Other 
studies also find evidence of a negative impact 
of international economic forces, such as trade 
(Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Smith and 
Wiest 2005), foreign direct investment (Meyer 
1996; Smith et al. 1999), and IMF structural 
adjustment programs (Abouharb and Cingranelli 
2009; Franklin 1997).
While concurring with the general negative 
impact of foreign economic penetration in 
peripheral countries, recent research has pro-
duced a more nuanced understanding of these 
effects by sorting out short- and long-term 
economic relations. First, Mosley and Uno 
(2007) argue that foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and trade have conceptually and empiri-
cally distinct effects on corporate behavior. FDI 
is a long-term investment in which corpora-
tions transfer their production capacity to a 
foreign country semi-permanently to reduce 
transaction costs of trade relations. Corpora-
tions select investment destinations carefully 
and work to improve the sustainability of the 
host country’s business environment (Gal-
lagher 2005; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 
2001). By contrast, corporations that prefer 
short-term transactions with foreign producers 
tend to engage in subcontracting relations with 
independent companies in foreign countries 
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with cheaper production costs, resulting in the 
formation of trade relations. Consequently, 
long-term investment relations lead to better 
labor conditions in host countries, for instance, 
while in short-term trade relations, corpora-
tions’ attention to labor conditions in subcon-
tractor locations is more cursory and labor 
practice is unlikely to improve (Mosley and 
Uno 2007). According to this argument, short-
term relations, because they comprise arm’s-
length transactions, are likely to be accompanied 
by weak pressure from trade partners to engage 
in CSR. Conversely, long-term investment 
leads to greater pressures to adopt CSR because 
of greater business embeddedness in the host 
country.
Second, other scholars propose that short-
term economic relations may in fact be more 
salient in their effect on domestic practices. 
Cao and Prakash (2011), for instance, argue 
that voluntary frameworks like ISO protocols 
serve as signals of corporations’ desirability in 
the marketplace, especially when actors in core 
countries select their economic partners in the 
periphery (cf. Clougherty and Grajek 2008; 
Potoski and Prakash 2009). Trade partners in 
short-term relations are more likely to rely on 
these proxy signals because short-term trans-
actions limit their capacity to collect more 
fine-grained information on their partners. 
Investors in long-term economic relations, on 
the other hand, are less likely to rely on these 
signals because they conduct more extensive 
screening before deciding on investment desti-
nations and have greater managerial and finan-
cial control to subsequently monitor their 
investees. Applied to global CSR frameworks, 
this argument predicts that short-term trade 
relations are more likely to be associated with 
adoption of CSR frameworks, because they 
serve as important signals of CSR commitment 
when actors in the core select their business 
partners in the periphery. In long-term invest-
ment relations, investors rely less on these 
signals because they can exert more control 
through screening and monitoring.
Hypothesis 3: Cross-national economic rela-
tions, through either short- or long-term 
transactions, exert pressure on governments 
and corporations in developing countries to 
participate in global CSR frameworks.
At the national level, political-economy 
research has long examined domestic power 
structures, especially the degree of collusion 
between political and economic elites (Block 
1977; Domhoff 1990). Drawing on this 
approach, some scholars argue that the con-
current rise of voluntary CSR frameworks 
and neoliberal economic policies is not a 
coincidence (Kinderman 2009; Meyer 2010; 
Sklair 2001). As major corporations promote 
the anti-regulation logic of neoliberalism to 
pursue profits more aggressively (Prechel and 
Morris 2010), they also attempt to deflect 
criticisms of accountability, avoid govern-
ment regulations, and gain legitimacy as 
social actors by working with policymakers 
to create voluntary CSR frameworks. We thus 
expect countries with more liberal economic 
systems will be more likely to have their gov-
ernment and corporations participate in these 
voluntary frameworks.
Hypothesis 4: The more liberal a national eco-
nomic system, the more likely the govern-
ment and corporations in a country will par-
ticipate in global CSR frameworks.
Different Levels of Commitment: 
Decoupling and Organized Hypocrisy
In this section, we examine CSR behavior 
beyond the baseline commitment of GC par-
ticipation and specify cross-national mecha-
nisms that lead to varying levels of 
commitment. First, the world society approach 
sees decoupling between formal policies and 
actual actions as a prevalent phenomenon in 
contemporary international society (Meyer 
2000; Meyer et al. 1997). Governments and 
organizations across the world adopt global 
models to attain legitimate standing in inter-
national society, but many of them lack the 
capacity to put these models into practice. 
Consequently, many governments and organi-
zations end up with formal policies and stated 
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commitments that they cannot uphold in prac-
tice, a prime example being ratification of 
human rights treaties by governments that do 
not have the means to alter their practices 
(Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). World 
society scholars emphasize that in developing 
countries, where resources to implement 
global models are severely lacking, commit-
ments to global models often end up being 
ceremonial rather than substantial (Meyer et 
al. 1997). Given the institutional foundations 
of world society research (Thomas et al. 
1987), this perspective on the decoupling 
process emphasizes the lack of capacity, 
assumes that discursive commitment will be 
mimetic or normative, and is agnostic about 
actors’ will to deliver on commitment to 
stated principles. In this scenario, corpora-
tions in developing countries join global CSR 
frameworks in the face of uncertain environ-
ments with poorly defined rules for ethical 
behavior. Not being cognizant of the concrete 
requirements, these corporations often lack 
the capacity to deliver on their commitments.
Hypothesis 5a: In developing countries, partici-
pation in global CSR frameworks will likely 
be ceremonial.
The critical political-economy approach, 
on the other hand, argues that rich and power-
ful actors do not necessarily practice the 
global models they promote to developing 
countries. A prime example is their imposi-
tion of neoliberal reforms on developing 
countries while they protect their own domes-
tic industries by high tariffs (Chang 2002; 
Wallerstein 1979). Scholars in this line of 
research have also been critical of actors in 
developed countries for constructing global 
voluntary CSR frameworks as a cover for 
continuing exploitation of labor and natural 
resources in developing countries (Smith 
2010; Somers 2008). From this perspective, 
global CSR frameworks reflect a pattern of 
organized hypocrisy (Krasner 1999), where 
actors in developed countries promote volun-
tary frameworks globally through their hege-
monic position in political and economic 
relations but do not implement the principles 
they promote or alter their actual behavior 
domestically. In this scenario, developed 
countries and their corporations do not deliver 
on their stated commitments, not because of 
capacity, but for a lack of will.
Hypothesis 5b: In developed countries, partici-
pation in global CSR frameworks will likely 
be ceremonial.
We examine these hypotheses in our inte-
grated analytic framework in an attempt to 
move beyond existing cross-national studies 
that typically privilege one set of factors over 
another. While the world society approach 
consistently demonstrates the global diffusion 
of norms and institutions, it falls short in 
understanding the diverse behavioral conse-
quences of these institutions beyond predic-
tions of decoupling (Meyer 2000; Meyer et al. 
1997). The world-system theory explains 
divergent political and economic outcomes 
across developed and developing nations 
(Chase-Dunn 1975; Wallerstein 1979), but it 
sees global norms as epiphenomenal and does 
not explain how such norms have driven the 
worldwide adoption of global models in recent 
decades. We integrate these two expla natory 
models, as summarized in Tables 4 and 5, to 
explain the growing popularity of global CSR 
frameworks and the conditions under which 
they are likely to lead to substantive or cere-
monial commitment. Analytically, our inte-
grated approach entails presentation of two 
sets of analyses. Our first set of analyses, as is 
typical with world society studies, considers 
all countries in the world; our second set of 
analyses, drawing on world-system research, 
distinguishes between developed and devel-
oping countries.
dATA ANd mETHodS
To test our hypotheses, we conducted multi-
variate time-series analyses of country-level 
data from the establishment of the Global 
Compact in 2000 to 2007. Our data comprise 
a total of 99 countries in this time period with 
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subsets of 27 developed and 72 developing 
countries.14
Dependent Variables
We use launch of the Global Compact in a 
country as a key indicator of government 
endorsement of CSR and we code the year in 
which a launching event occurs.15 We also 
obtained data directly from the Global 
Compact’s UN office that allowed us to employ 
two measures of corporate participation in 
CSR: the number of corporations in a country 
that are members of the Global Compact (i.e., 
baseline commitment) and the number of cor-
porations that default on their COP require-
ments (i.e., ceremonial commitment).16 We 
also obtained a third measure from the Global 
Reporting Initiative’s online database, the 
number of corporations in a country that 
employed GRI reporting standards (i.e., sub-
stantive commitment).
Independent Variables
To capture global institutional pressure, we use 
the number of international nongovernmental 
organization memberships available from the 
Yearbook of International Organizations 
(Union of International Associations 2000 
to 2008),17 and the number of international 
human rights, environmental, and labor treaties 
ratified by a country, coded from the respective 
online databases of the United Nations and the 
International Labour Organization.18 We also 
use the number of Global Compact partici-
pants in other countries in the same region to 
examine effects of regional pressure. We coded 
countries into six regions: Africa, the Americas, 
Asia, Australasia, Europe, and the Middle 
East.
We measure local receptivity to CSR by 
democracy, public sector transparency, level of 
education, past Global Compact participants in 
the country, and Global Compact launch in the 
country. The democracy score (an autocracy–
democracy scale) comes from the Polity IV 
Project’s Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions online database.19 As a measure of 
the capacity of citizens in a country to under-
stand CSR principles, we use level of educa-
tion in a country. We employ the most 
commonly used measure of the general level 
of education, secondary school enrollment.20 
Our transparency measure is derived from 
Transparency International’s Corruption Per-
ceptions Index.21 Number of GC participants, 
which is a measure of corporate peer pressure, 
and a GC launch event in a country (in the 
previous year), which is an indicator of broader 
societal pressure, reflect the degree of legiti-
macy of the Global Compact in a country.22
In gauging effects of foreign economic pen-
etration, we employ two key indicators—a 








Institutional Factors Decoupling Divergence between  
domestic resources  
and pressures to adopt 
legitimate global models; 
lack of capacity
H5a: In developing  
countries, participation 
in global CSR  




Organized hypocrisy Political and economic  
hegemony in interna-
tional relations; lack  
of will
H5b: In developed  
countries, participation 
in global CSR frame-
works will likely be 
ceremonial.
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given country’s bilateral investment context 
and bilateral export context. We follow recent 
advances made by Prakash and Potoski (2006) 
and Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash (2009) and 
constructed more precise bilateral measures of 
foreign direct investment and trade than those 
used by previous studies. These measures ena-
ble us to track more specifically how pressures 
to adopt CSR flow through economic ties and 
supply chains (Bair 2008; Gereffi, Humphrey, 
and Sturgeon 2005; Jiang 2008). Bilateral 
investment context is the average of the number 
of Global Compact participants in the invest-
ment origin country, weighted by the propor-
tion of inward FDI from a given origin country 
to the total level of inward FDI in the host 
country in each year.23 This reflects the idea 
that CSR adoption in a country is influenced 
specifically by the level of support for CSR in 
the home country from which that investment 
originates. Bilateral export context is the aver-
age of the number of Global Compact partici-
pants in a country’s export destinations, 
weighted by the proportion of exports to each 
destination to the total level of exports of a 
particular country in each year.24 This reflects 
the idea that the level of support for CSR in 
importing countries influences exporting coun-
tries’ CSR adoption practices.25
As an indicator of a country’s national eco-
nomic system, we use a measure of a country’s 
ruling political party platform and agenda with 
respect to economic policy, available from the 
World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions 
(Beck et al. 2001). This indicator refers to the 
extent to which a country’s government can be 
classified as right, center, or left-oriented with 
regard to economic issues.26
We also employ two control variables: a 
country’s total number of listed domestic 
companies and GDP per capita (constant 
2000 US$), from the World Bank’s (2008) 
World Development Indicators. The former 
controls for the potential number of corporate 
adherents to CSR frameworks and the latter 
for the size of the economy.
All covariates included in our models are 
time-varying annual variables, and all inde-
pendent variables are lagged by one year. We 
performed natural logarithmic transforma-
tions of variables that exhibited skewed dis-
tributions, adding a constant to variables 
where the lowest original values were either 
zero or negative.27
Methods
We employed two distinct modeling techniques 
to deal with the different distributional charac-
teristics of our dependent variables. First, we 
conducted an event history analysis of the fac-
tors leading to government endorsement of the 
Global Compact, using the semiparametric Cox 
proportional hazards model to examine the time 
to launch of the GC in a country with a risk set 
of all countries in the world.28 After accounting 
for missing data, we obtained 449 country-year 
observations with a total of 99 countries in our 
dataset. In our analyses, we used robust variance 
estimation in place of standard calculations (Lin 
and Wei 1989) and clustered data by country to 
address possible problems with heteroskedastic-
ity (Beck and Katz 1995). Our subset of devel-
oped countries includes 27 OECD countries 
with a total of 132 country-year observations. In 
models where we specifically examine a risk set 
of developing countries, our data consist of 317 
country-year observations with a total of 72 
non-OECD countries.29
Second, in analyses of the number of corpo-
rate participants in CSR frameworks, we 
employed negative binomial regression analy-
ses because our dependent variables comprise 
overdispersed count data (Hilbe 2007; Long 
1997).30 For these dependent variables, we used 
robust variance estimation and clustered data 
by country. We obtained 431 country-year 
observations with a total of 99 countries in the 
overall analyses; there are 130 country-year 
observations for 27 developed countries and 
301 country-year observations for 72 develop-
ing countries.
RESuLTS
Table 6 presents our event history and nega-
tive binomial results for all 99 countries in 
our data; Tables 7 and 8 present results for the 
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subsets of 27 developed countries and 72 
developing countries, respectively. For our 
event history models, we report coefficients 
instead of hazard ratios.
Overall Findings for All Countries: 
Institutional Effects on Global CSR
Table 6 indicates that, overall, institutional 
effects operate fairly strongly at the interna-
tional level. INGO pressure has consistently 
positive significant effects on Global Compact 
(baseline commitment) and Global Reporting 
Initiative (substantive commitment) partici-
pation. We replaced general INGOs with 
human rights and environmental INGOs and 
found that effects of these specific INGO 
variables are virtually identical to those of 
general INGOs in all analyses.31 Effects point 
toward solid commitment to CSR principles 
because there is no significant effect on COP 
defaults (ceremonial commitment). Treaty 
effects are consistently negative, although 
significant only on substantive commitment. 
This suggests that government commitment 
to global progressive norms does not neces-
sarily lead to corporate commitment to CSR 
and may even discourage substantive com-
mitment. Although these treaty effects go 
against our hypothesis about international 
linkage, they are consistent with existing 
studies that show treaty ratification has little 
correlation with actual relevant practices 
(Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Hathaway 
2002; Meyer 2010; Wotipka and Tsutsui 
2008). These results indicate partial support 
for Hypothesis 1 and that positive effects of 
global institutional pressure on CSR adoption 
operate primarily through nongovernmental, 
rather than governmental, channels.
At the national level, national launch of 
the GC (government endorsement) increases 
the likelihood of baseline and ceremonial 
commitment. This suggests that government 
endorsement is the primary national-level 
factor that shapes local receptivity to CSR 
frameworks. However, the level of govern-
ment influence on the private sector varies 
across developed and developing countries, 
and we anticipate that some effects of national 
institutional factors might vary across the two 
worlds.
Overall Findings for All Countries: 
Political-Economy Effects on Global 
CSR
Among the political-economy variables, a 
country’s bilateral export context is positive 
and significant for government endorsement 
and substantive commitment. This indicates 
that countries and corporations that export to 
countries with more Global Compact compa-
nies are more likely to adopt CSR frame-
works, supporting the argument that 
short-term, arm’s-length economic relations 
give rise to CSR adoption as a strategy for 
signaling good business practices (cf. Cao 
and Prakash 2011). Long-term economic rela-
tions, in the form of foreign direct invest-
ment, do not exert pressure to adopt CSR, 
suggesting that signals for CSR commitment 
are less important in long-term relations.
A more liberal national economic system 
seems to encourage ceremonial commitment. 
Because the existing debate on this issue pri-
marily targets rich countries that implement 
neoliberal policies domestically and pressure 
other countries to follow suit (Stiglitz 2002), 
we suspect that effects of a country’s national 
economic system operate differently in devel-
oped versus developing nations.
Differences between Developed and 
Developing Countries: Institutional 
Effects
Tables 7 and 8 present results of our analyses 
of developed and developing countries. In 
developed countries (see Table 7), INGO 
linkage has positive significant effects on 
baseline and ceremonial commitment but not 
on substantive commitment. By contrast, 
Table 8 shows that in developing countries, 
INGO linkage has positive significant effects 
on all but ceremonial commitment. These 
results show that global institutional pressure 
through nongovernmental channels is more 
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Table 6. Event History Analysis and Negative Binomial Regression of CSR Adoption, All 99 
Countries, 2000 to 2007
Event History 





Model 2:  
Baseline  
Commitment
















GDP per capita (log) −1.685** −.390 −.163 −.214
 (.565) (.359) (.300) (.447)
Listed domestic companies .008 .016 .022 .021
 (.015) (.014) (.013) (.011)
International Institutional
INGO memberships (log) 2.730** 1.429** 2.365*** .586
 (.941) (.476) (.534) (.572)
International treaties ratified −.026 −.060 −.164** −.066
 (.053) (.045) (.059) (.052)











Democracy .062 .041 .063 −.063
 (.044) (.027) (.054) (.041)






























Global Compact launch 1.700*** .520 1.868***
 (.310) (.302) (.395)
International Political-Economy
Bilateral investment context −.830 −.002 −.018 .009
 (1.030) (.047) (.062) (.028)
Bilateral export context     .008*** .004 .002** .004
 (.002) (.002) (.001) (.002)
National Political-Economy










Constant −8.260*** −15.32*** −5.803**
 (1.867) (2.407) (2.138)
N country-observations 449 431 431 431
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
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Table 7. Event History Analysis and Negative Binomial Regression of CSR Adoption, 27 
Developed Countries, 2000 to 2007
Event History 

























GDP per capita (log) −.063 .303 .633 −.099
 (1.176) (.347) (.552) (.574)
Listed domestic companies .041    .036*** .048** .052*
 (.029) (.008) (.015) (.022)
International Institutional
INGO memberships (log) 1.845 4.919*** .642 4.481*
 (1.419) (.600) (.884) (1.824)
International treaties ratified .129 −.005 −.020 .016
 (.111) (.031) (.060) (.086)











Democracy −.993 −1.293*** .028 −1.278***
 (.730) (.217) (.333) (.346)






























Global Compact launch 1.226*** −.097 1.372
 (.279) (.264) (.735)
International Political-Economy
Bilateral investment context 13.900 −21.07** −7.842 6.906
 (12.690) (6.570) (5.466) (8.898)
Bilateral export context −.009 .023*** .003 .021*
 (.015) (.005) (.007) (.009)
National Political-Economy











Constant −31.53*** −12.46* −3.29**
 (4.090) (5.261) (1.610)
N country-observations 132 130 130 130
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
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Table 8. Event History Analysis and Negative Binomial Regression of CSR Adoption, 72 
Developing Countries, 2000 to 2007
Event History 

























GDP per capita (log) −2.440** −.348 −.710 .129
 (.913) (.430) (.526) (.549)
Listed domestic companies .013 −.022 −.032 −.004
 (.020) (.013) (.025) (.014)
International Institutional
INGO memberships (log) 2.515* 1.657** 3.508* .991
 (1.113) (.510) (1.439) (.667)
International treaties ratified −.108 −.094 −.186* −.084
 (.074) (.055) (.089) (.069)











Democracy .085 .049 .088* −.050
 (.056) (.027) (.044) (.044)




















Past Global Compact  









Global Compact launch 2.344*** 1.034* 2.184***
 (.432) (.521) (.596)
International Political-Economy
Bilateral investment context −2.621 −.009 −.040 .013
 (2.151) (.052) (.074) (.030)
Bilateral export context .010** .003 .002* .003
 (.003) (.002) (.001) (.002)
National Political-Economy










Constant −1.28*** −18.32* −9.829**
 (2.928) (7.916) (3.209)
N country-observations 317 301 301 301
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
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effective in prompting deeper CSR commit-
ment in developing countries, while the same 
pressure leads to ceremonial commitment in 
developed countries. Treaty ratification has a 
negative significant effect on substantive 
commitment among developing countries, 
again reflecting the divergence between gov-
ernment commitment and corporate behavior, 
but specifically for developing countries.
Among national-level factors, democracy 
discourages baseline and ceremonial commit-
ment in developed countries, whereas in 
developing countries, democracy encourages 
substantive commitment. The former finding 
suggests that in developed countries that are 
strong democracies, corporations are more 
cautious about participating in global CSR 
frameworks but, once they participate, they 
are less likely to default on their commitment. 
The latter finding shows that in developing 
countries, democratic governance encourages 
corporations to participate in global CSR 
frameworks in a substantive way. Among 
other effects, corporate GC participation and 
GC launch have mutually reinforcing effects 
in developing countries. Furthermore, GC 
launch encourages substantive and ceremo-
nial commitment. This implies that govern-
ment endorsement increases participation and 
substantive commitments in global CSR 
frameworks. At the same time, however, gov-
ernment endorsement in developing countries 
pushes many corporations that do not have 
the capacity to submit reports to participate in 
these frameworks.32 In developed countries, 
GC launch leads to an increase in baseline 
commitment but not other forms of commit-
ment. GC launch thus seems to encourage 
only a shallow level of commitment to CSR.
Differences between Developed and 
Developing Countries: Political-
Economy Effects
Concerning effects of foreign economic pen-
etration, we focus on our analysis of develop-
ing countries, as stated in Hypothesis 3. 
Bilateral investment context is not significant 
in any of our models in Table 8. Bilateral 
export context, on the other hand, is positive 
and significant for government endorsement 
and substantive commitment. Again, we find 
support for the effect of short-term economic 
relations described in Hypothesis 3. This sug-
gests that governments and corporations in 
developing countries are more concerned 
about appealing to their trade partners by 
committing to CSR frameworks. While our 
focus here is on developing countries, we 
note that in developed countries, bilateral 
export context has positive significant effects 
on baseline and ceremonial commitment; 
short-term economic relations encourage 
shallow commitment to CSR in developed 
countries.
Effects of government orientation to eco-
nomic policy show that in developed and devel-
oping countries, neoliberal economic policies 
encourage baseline commitment. Only in devel-
oped countries, however, does this variable have 
a positive significant effect on ceremonial com-
mitment. These findings indicate that corpora-
tions based in developed countries that adopt 
neoliberal economic policies are likely to make 
ceremonial commitments to global CSR frame-
works, suggesting a pattern of organized hypoc-
risy. Combined with much evidence in case 
studies about corporations’ role in promoting 
global voluntary CSR frameworks, this finding 
supports Hypothesis 5b and lends credibility to 
the argument that major corporations in rich 
countries use voluntary CSR frameworks to 




Our three sets of analyses revealed how 
national- and international-level factors com-
bine to condition the global expansion of 
CSR. Results also showed that effects of 
institutional and political-economy factors 
must be examined in relation to one another 
and not in separate analyses. Furthermore, 
our analyses highlighted the importance of 
sorting out different CSR dynamics in two 
economic contexts—developed and developing 
88  American Sociological Review 77(1)
countries—which has been suggested by case 
studies but not systematically examined.
Although analyses of the full sample of coun-
tries show positive effects of nongovernmental 
linkages on substantive commitment, separate 
subsample analyses reveal that this effect 
stands only for developing countries. Among 
developed countries, international nongovern-
mental linkages actually lead to ceremonial 
commitment. Combined with the positive 
effect of liberal economic policies on ceremo-
nial commitment in developed countries, our 
results suggest a pattern of organized hypoc-
risy among developed countries in imposing 
CSR norms on developing countries while 
shielding their own economies from these 
norms. The international political-economy 
linkage results underscore this point further, 
as short-term economic relations encourage 
substantive commitment in developing coun-
tries but ceremonial commitment in devel-
oped countries. Faced with pressures to signal 
commitment to CSR, corporations in develop-
ing countries are more likely to make serious 
efforts and submit GRI reports, but many 
corporations in developed countries seek only 
the signaling effect and fail to submit required 
reports to the GC. Although our statistical 
evidence does not allow us to make conclu-
sive statements here, empirical studies on 
CSR frameworks document a history of 
developed countries rejecting regulations and 
promoting voluntary frameworks (Sagafi-
Nejad 2008), as well as evidence of lax com-
mitment to the resulting voluntary frameworks 
(Oshionebo 2009; Smith 2010). Our analyses 
thus lend further support to the arguments of 
political-economy scholars but, notably, with 
effects operating not only through political-
economy linkages but also through institu-
tional linkages. This underscores Beckfield’s 
(2003) insight that developed countries 
use nongovernmental channels to maintain 
their influence and advantage in international 
society.
Among national-level factors, democracy 
makes corporations in developed countries 
cautious because citizens in democratic con-
texts are more likely to hold corporations 
accountable for their stated commitment to 
CSR. Consequently, in advanced democracies, 
corporations that participate in the GC are less 
likely to default on their commitments. In 
developing countries, democracy encourages 
corporations to make substantive commit-
ments and adopt the GRI. Government 
endorsement pushes corporations in develop-
ing countries to commit to CSR, and even to 
make substantive commitments, but it also 
leads to a greater likelihood of corporations 
failing to submit required reports, most likely 
due to a lack of capacity to follow through.
Our analyses are not without shortcom-
ings. The difficulties inherent in compiling 
consistent and reliable cross-national data 
preclude more fine-tuned analyses with direct 
measures of other factors that could conceiv-
ably affect corporate CSR behavior, such as 
the types of corporations (e.g., exposure to 
consumer pressure or existence of industry-
level CSR frameworks) and characteristics of 
corporate elites (e.g., type and place of educa-
tion and demographic spread of MBA degree 
holders). Future research should examine 
these factors in industry-, corporate-, or indi-
vidual-level analyses, bearing in mind effects 
of national, international, institutional, and 
economic environments on CSR that we 
highlight here. Future research should also 
examine alternative measures of commitment 
to CSR to determine the extent to which vol-
untary CSR frameworks can effect actual 
changes in CSR practices.
These issues notwithstanding, our findings 
point to several theoretical and practical impli-
cations. First, by developing an integrated 
analytic framework that incorporates institu-
tional and political-economy factors, we pre-
sented a more comprehensive understanding 
of globalization’s effects on organizational 
behavior. Institutional and political-economy 
arguments have their merits, but our findings 
call for more careful specification of the con-
ditions under which these arguments hold. 
While we found strong support for the main 
world society thesis on global diffusion, even 
after controlling for other factors, the overall 
homogenizing effects can also conceal different 
influences of international linkages for devel-
oped and developing countries (Longhofer 
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and Schofer 2010), as well as differential 
effects of governmental and nongovernmen-
tal linkages (Boli and Thomas 1997; Hafner-
Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Jang and Luo 2000; 
Tsutsui 2004). This is especially true in exam-
ining the relationship between stated commit-
ment to global models and actual local 
behavior. Regarding political-economy argu-
ments, our results highlighted the important 
distinction between long- and short-term eco-
nomic relations. While political-economy 
theorists may be skeptical about the potential 
benefits of all forms of foreign economic 
penetration, we found that in developing 
countries, short-term trade relations help 
encourage government endorsement and sub-
stantive commitment among corporations.
Second, our analyses suggest that the 
global North, which is largely responsible for 
the institutional design of current CSR frame-
works and for shaping the agenda of global 
civil society (Beckfield 2003), is exerting 
normative pressure on corporations in devel-
oping countries to make substantive commit-
ments to CSR principles while their own 
corporations respond to this pressure by mak-
ing ceremonial commitments. This suggests 
that the problem of integrating CSR princi-
ples with actual practice stems not from lack 
of resources or capacity per se, but from 
paucity of will and political action. Our theo-
retical contribution here is the distinction 
between two different mechanisms that lead 
to disengagement between actors’ stated 
intent and their subsequent action: decoupling 
due to a lack of capacity, highlighted by the 
world society approach (Meyer et al. 1997), 
and organized hypocrisy due to a lack of will 
and political action, emphasized by political-
economy approaches (Krasner 1999). Our 
findings suggest that organized hypocrisy is a 
stronger force in global CSR, although further 
evidence is needed for a more definitive con-
clusion on this issue.
On the other hand, our analyses also reveal 
the potential for international linkages to but-
tress deeper corporate commitment to CSR by 
acting as conduits for promoting the growing 
legitimacy of CSR principles in international 
society. There is an important parallel here with 
the way in which human rights treaties have 
elevated human rights norms through interna-
tional linkages, altering many governments’ 
behavior after decades of empty promises 
(Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). As global 
CSR frameworks increase the number of par-
ticipant corporations and ratchet up reporting 
and rating requirements for membership, what 
started out as empty promises by corporations 
might lead to actual changes in CSR practice.
Table A1. Variables in the Analyses
Variable Source Measure Notes
Global Compact 
Launch
UN Global  
Compact Office
Dichotomous measure of country- 
level adoption of the Global  
Compact
Lagged by one year 




UN Global  
Compact Office
Number of corporate Global Compact 
participants in a given country
Lagged by one year 







Number of corporate Global Reporting 




UN Global  
Compact Office
Number of corporate Global Compact 
participants in a given country that 
have not submitted the requisite 
Communications on Progress (i.e., 
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UN Global  
Compact  
Office
Number of Global Compact partici-
pants in a given region of the  
world (Africa, Americas, Asia,  
Australasia, Europe, Middle East)
Divided by a constant 
to facilitate interpre-





World Bank  
World Develop-
ment Indicators
Per capita gross domestic product  
in a given country (constant,  
2000 US$)




World Bank  
World Develop-
ment Indicators
Total number of listed domestic  
companies in a given country
Lagged by one year,  
divided by a constant 
to facilitate interpre-




Union of  
International 
Associations
Number of memberships in interna-
tional nongovernmental organiza-
tions (Cluster I – Categories A-D)








Number of international human 
rights, environmental, and labor 
treaties ratified by a given country
Lagged by one year
Democracy Polity IV Project Index of democracy based on five  
key institutional characteristics  
of a given country, from –10 (most 
autocratic) to 10 (most democratic)






Aggregate indicator of country  
experts’ and business leaders’  
perception of corruption in the 
public sector of a given country  
on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt)  
to 10 (very clean)








Ratio of total enrollment, regardless  
of age, to the population of the  
age group that officially corre-
sponds to the level of secondary 
school education




UNCTAD, OECD Average of the number of Global  
Compact participants in the  
investment origin country, weight-
ed by the proportion of inward FDI 
from a given origin country to the 
total level of inward FDI in the host 
country in each year
Lagged by one year, 
divided by a constant 
to facilitate interpre-




UNCTAD Average of the number of Global 
Compact participants in a country’s 
export destinations, weighted by 
the proportion of exports to each 
destination to the total level of 
exports of a particular country in 
each year





Database of  
Political  
Institutions
Measure of a government’s ruling par-
ty orientation to economic policy in 
a given country, categorically coded 
as 1 (left), 2 (center), and 3 (right)
Lagged by one year
Table A1. (continued)
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Table A2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Analyses
Variables Mean SD Min. Max.
Global Compact Launch (lagged) .16 .37 0 1
Global Compact Participants (lagged) 2.68 10.99 0 161
Global Reporting Initiative Participants (lagged) 1.51 6.43 0 132
COP Defaults (lagged) .27 1.66 0 29
GDP per Capita (log) 7.62 1.58 4.39 10.90
Listed Domestic Companies/100 4.41 10.09 0 76.51
INGO Memberships (log) 6.24 1.14 −6.91 8.35
International Treaties Ratified 19.35 5.25 0 31
Global Compact Participants (by region)/100 3.10 4.70 0 19.34
Democracy 3.36 6.57 −10 10
Secondary School Enrollment (% gross) 71.92 31.49 5.18 161.66
Corruption Perceptions Index Score 4.28 2.25 .40 10
Past Global Compact Participants (by country) 2.73 11.11 0 161
Global Compact Launch .16 .37 0 1
Bilateral Investment Context/1000 32.20 1005.23 −.08 38000
Bilateral Export Context 155.02 1506.71 .08 38699.70
Government Orientation to Economic Policy 1.92 .71 1 3
Table A3. Correlations of Covariates in the Analyses
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 GDP per Capita (log)  
2 Listed Domestic  
Companies
.17  
3 INGO Memberships 
(log)
.68 .36  
4 International Treaties 
Ratified
.03 −.25 .26  
5 Global Compact  
Participants (by 
region)/100
.15 −.02 .22 .48  
6 Democracy .35 .15 .49 .38 .25  
7 Corruption Perceptions 
Index Score
.83 .16 .59 −.04 .05 .31  
8 Secondary School  
Enrollment (% gross)
.73 .08 .56 .27 .24 .38 .64  
9 Past Global Compact 
Participants (by 
Country)
.10 .17 .22 .13 .23 .09 .05 .09  
10 Global Compact Launch −.01 .14 .24 .19 .30 .12 .06 .01 .36  
11 Bilateral Investment 
Context
−.08 −.05 −.14 .01 .11 .02 −.09 .01 .01 .04  
12 Bilateral Export Context −.01 −.06 −.08 .12 .26 .02 −.09 −.05 .07 .17 .01  
13 Government Orienta-
tion to Economic 
Policy
.09 .07 .00 .01 .04 .15 .05 −.04 .04 −.02 −.09 .06
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Notes
 1. Many other scholars adopt a similar definition of 
CSR but we chose this one for its explicitly global 
scope. This definition is consistent with standard defi-
nitions of CSR. For example, Davis (1973:312) 
defines CSR as “the firm’s consideration of, and 
response to, issues beyond the narrow economic, 
technical, and legal requirements of the firm.” More 
recently, Barnett (2007:801) stipulates CSR as “a dis-
cretionary allocation of corporate resources toward 
improving social welfare that serves as a means of 
enhancing relationships with key stakeholders.” See 
Carroll (1999) for many other examples.
 2. Similar efforts by the UN Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights started in 
this period but took much negotiation; the resulting 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Cor-
porations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard 
to Human Rights was adopted in 2003.
 3. Other examples of industry self-regulation include 
the Forest Stewardship Council in 1993 (Bartley 
2007a, 2007b; Conroy 2001), the Fairtrade Labeling 
Organizations International for coffee trades in 1998 
(Conroy 2001), and the Extractive Industry Transpar-
ency Initiative in the energy and mining sector in 
2002 (Sullivan 2003). For many other examples, see 
Bartley (2007a), Leipziger (2003), and Waddock (2008).
 4. Other major global frameworks include Social Account-
ability 8000 (1997); AccountAbility (1999); and the 
International Organization for Standardization’s (ISO) 
ISO14000 module (1996) and the ISO26000 guide-
lines, which was launched in November 2010.
 5. To be clear, corporations within a country can join the 
GC even if a country-level launch of the GC has not 
taken place.
 6. To sustain the momentum created by GC launches, 
involved parties often establish Global Compact 
Local Networks (GCLNs), which are “clusters of par-
ticipants who come together to advance the Global 
Compact and its principles at the local level” (UN 
Global Compact Office 2007:8). GCLNs are busi-
ness-led but include engagement with multiple 
stakeholders, such as “representatives of civil society, 
labour, academia and/or governmental organizations” 
(UN Global Compact Office 2007:13).
 7. See the UN Global Compact’s online database: http://
www.unglobalcompact.org/NetworksAroundThe 
World/.
 8. We also used the number of COP submissions in a 
country in our multivariate analyses, but we do not 
report those results (available upon request) because 
they were virtually identical to results using the base-
line GC participation.
 9. See the GRI’s online database of reports: http://www.
globalreporting.org/GRIReports/GRIReportsList/.
10. In our data, the correlation between COP submissions 
and GRI reporting is .46.
11. Please see Table S1 in the online supplement (http://
asr.sagepub.com/supplemental) for years of GC 
launch in various countries from the GC’s inception 
in 2000 to the end of 2007.
12. These studies focus primarily on the formation and 
institution-building phase of CSR frameworks, while 
our analysis examines international proliferation of 
the institutional form, that is, corporate participation 
in CSR frameworks. We agree that both institutional 
and market forces operate on the ground to shape the 
organizational field, but we argue that different fac-
tors in the organizational environment become more 
important in the proliferation phase compared to the 
institution-building phase, in which institutional 
entrepreneurs and powerful state and business elites 
play key roles.
13. Table S2 in the online supplement lists these treaties. 
International treaties on accounting transparency are 
more recent phenomena but one such treaty, the UN 
Convention Against Corruption, emerged in 2003.
14. See Table S3 in the online supplement for a list of all 
the countries in the analyses.
15. Global Compact launches in a country are typically 
(although not necessarily) accompanied by establish-
ment of a Global Compact Local Network (GCLN) in 
that country. Because the Global Compact’s online data-
base uses these terms interchangeably, we coded the 
year in which a GCLN was established in countries 
where no GC launch date was given in the database.
16. For membership in the Global Compact, corporate 
subsidiaries that operate in other countries can and do 
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become GC members independently from their head-
quarter companies. For example, Coca-Cola has more 
than 300 bottling partners in the world, but only 18 
that bear the Coca-Cola name outside the United 
States are members of the Global Compact. Likewise, 
11 of these bottling partners have also adopted GRI 
guidelines. We interpret this to mean that countries in 
which these subsidiaries are located have different 
institutional and economic conditions compared to 
other subsidiaries, which lead the former to partici-
pate in CSR frameworks but not the latter. In our data, 
headquarter and subsidiary corporations are specified 
as separate and independent counts. This allows us to 
more safely test if there are important country-level 
dynamics that push certain corporations (including 
foreign subsidiaries) to participate in the Global 
Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative.
17. For the number of INGO memberships per country, 
we used Cluster I (Categories A-D) organizations as 
defined by the Union of International Associations’ 
categorization. Cluster I organizations include federa-
tions of international organizations, universal 
membership organizations, intercontinental member-
ship organizations, and limited or regionally defined 
membership organizations and excludes, for example, 
internationally oriented national organizations and 
inactive or dissolved organizations. We employ Clus-
ter I organizations to be specific about global effects, 
that is, influences that originate from external rather 
than internal sources. We also use more specific mea-
sures: human rights and environmental INGO 
memberships. These data were coded by Dawn Wiest 
and Jackie Smith from the UIA Yearbooks (Wiest and 
Smith forthcoming). We thank them for making the 
data available for our analyses.
18. See http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx 
and http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm.
19. See http://systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. The 
Polity IV Project operationalizes democracy based on 
five primary institutional characteristics: competi-
tiveness of the process for chief executive selection, 
openness of that process to social groups, level of 
institutional constraints placed on the chief execu-
tive’s decision-making authority, competitiveness of 
political participation, and degree to which binding 
rules govern political participation. The resulting 
index ranges from –10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most 
democratic).
20. The measure for secondary school enrollment comes 
from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 
2008) and measures the ratio of total enrollment, 
regardless of age, to the population of the age group 
that officially corresponds to the level of secondary 
school education.
21. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI) comprises an aggregate indicator of 
country experts’ and business leaders’ perceptions of 
corruption in the public sector. The Corruption 
Perceptions Index ranks countries annually on a scale 
from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean) (Transpar-
ency International 2010).
22. In models on ceremonial commitment, we use the 
past Global Compact participants variable as a con-
trol. Because only participating corporations are 
expected to submit reports, countries with a greater 
number of GC participants tend to have a greater 
number of corporations that fail to submit the required 
report. We control for this tendency with the past GC 
participant variable.
23. Bilateral investment contexti = ΣjGCj * (FDIij/Total 
FDIi); where GCj is the number of GC participants in 
each origin country j, FDIij is the stock of inward FDI 
from origin country j to country i, and Total FDIi is 
the total stock of inward FDI in host country i from all 
origin countries. Following Prakash and Potoski 
(2006), we use FDI stock rather than FDI inflows to 
reflect that investment decisions are long-term com-
mitments rather than short-term decisions. We further 
specify inward FDI to be from OECD countries 
(which tend to have more institutionalized CSR stan-
dards and higher levels of investment in other 
countries). We obtained bilateral investment data 
from the UNCTAD (http://unctadstat.unctad.org) and 
OECD (http://stats.oecd.org) statistics databases. We 
divided this variable by 1,000 to facilitate interpreta-
tion of the resulting regression coefficients.
24. Bilateral export contexti = ΣjGCj * (Exportsij/Total 
Exportsi); where GCj is the number of GC partici-
pants in each destination country j, Exportsij is the 
volume of exports sent from country i to country j, 
and Total Exportsi is the total volume of exports sent 
from country i to all destinations. We obtained bilat-
eral export data from the UNCTAD statistics database 
(http://unctadstat.unctad.org).
25. We also conducted alternative model specifications 
using more conventional indicators of foreign eco-
nomic penetration, including foreign direct 
investment, trade, portfolio investment, short-term 
debt, and total external debt (see, e.g., Kentor 1998; 
Kentor and Boswell 2003; Richards et al. 2001); we 
obtained largely similar results with our final analyses, 
with key variables being robust across models (results 
available upon request). We believe that our use of 
bilateral economic indicators captures the impact of 
economic ties and supply chain pressures on CSR 
adoption more directly. We are grateful to an anony-
mous reviewer for this suggestion. See Part II in the 
online supplement for additional analyses of trade and 
supply chain issues in CSR for problematic sectors.
26. The “execrlc” measure in the Database of Political 
Institutions classifies party orientation to economic 
policy categorically: “left” for socialist, social-demo-
cratic agendas; “right” for parties with liberal 
economic agendas; and “center” for centrist parties 
(Keefer 2009:6). We coded these categories in the 
database as 1 (left), 2 (center), 3 (right).
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27. Please see Tables A1, A2, and A3 in the Appendix for 
operationalization, descriptive statistics, and correla-
tion matrix for all the variables.
28. We conducted tests of the proportional hazard 
assumptions of our use of the Cox model based on 
Schoenfeld residuals for our full sample of 99 coun-
tries (χ2 = 8.93, Prob > χ2 =.709), our sample of 27 
developed countries (χ2 = 12.48, Prob > χ2 =.408), and 
our sample of 72 developing countries (χ2 = 2.93, 
Prob > χ2 =.996). These tests are not significant, sug-
gesting that our models do not violate the 
proportionality assumption.
29. Our final sample of countries was determined largely 
by the available cross-national data. Including the 
total number of listed domestic companies as a 
covariate reduced the number of countries in our 
dataset. Omitting this covariate increased the number 
of countries to 127 for all countries and 100 develop-
ing countries. As a robustness check, we report that 
effects of our main covariates were largely similar in 
analyses without the total number of companies vari-
able (results available upon request).
30. To assess the model fit of our negative binomial regres-
sion models, we ran equivalent generalized linear 
models (GLM) and specified a logarithmic link function 
(family negative binomial) to obtain AIC and BIC statis-
tics (Hilbe 2007). AIC and BIC statistics for all our 
GLM (negative binomial) models were smaller in size 
compared to GLM (Poisson) models with the same vari-
ables, indicating that negative binomial models provided 
a better fit. These statistics are available upon request.
31. This is the case in all subsequent analyses. Results are 
available upon request.
32. Although education has a positive significant effect in 
one model, we treat this result carefully because the vari-
able is highly correlated with GDP per capita. We 
nonetheless retain the variable in the model because we 
obtained reasonable VIF statistics and, more impor-
tantly, because excluding this variable from the model 
can bias our results for other variables (Arcenaux and 
Huber 2007; Greene 2003; O’Brien 2007).
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